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Abstract
The classical Hotelling game is played on a line segment whose points represent uniformly
distributed clients. The n players of the game are servers who need to place themselves on
the line segment, and once this is done, each client gets served by the player closest to it. The
goal of each player is to choose its location so as to maximize the number of clients it attracts.
In this paper we study a variant of the Hotelling game where each client v has a tolerance
interval, randomly distributed according to some density function f , and v gets served by the
nearest among the players eligible for it, namely, those that fall within its interval. (If no such
player exists, then v abstains.) It turns out that this modification significantly changes the
behavior of the game and its states of equilibria. In particular, it may serve to explain why
players sometimes prefer to “spread out,” rather than to cluster together as dictated by the
classical Hotelling game.
We consider two variants of the game: symmetric games, where clients have the same
tolerance range to their left and right, and asymmetric games, where the left and right ranges
of each client are determined independently of each other. We characterize the Nash equilibria
of the 2-player game. For n ≥ 3 players, we characterize a specific class of strategy profiles,
referred to as canonical profiles, and show that these profiles are the only ones that may yield
Nash equilibria in our game. Moreover, the canonical profile, if exists, is uniquely defined
for every n and f . In the symmetric setting, we give simple conditions for the canonical
profile to be a Nash equilibrium, and demonstrate their application for several distributions.
In the asymmetric setting, the conditions for equilibria are more complex; still, we derive a
full characterization for the Nash equilibria of the exponential distribution. Finally, we show
that for some distributions the simple conditions given for the symmetric setting are sufficient
also for a Nash equilibrium in the asymmetric setting.
Keywords: Hotelling games, Pure Nash equilibria, Uniqueness of equilibrium.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
The Hotelling game, introduced in the seminal [23], is a widely studied model of spatial com-
petition in a variety of contexts, ranging from the placement of commercial facilities, to the
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differentiation between similar products of competing brands, to the positioning of candidates in
political elections. The well known toy example is as follows: two ice cream vendors choose a
location on a beach strip. Beach goers are uniformly distributed on the beach, and each buys ice
cream from the closest vendor. The goal of each vendor is to maximize the number of customers
he 1 receives. The well known result is that the only Nash equilibrium is for both vendors to
locate at the median. This explains why sellers bunch together, but also why political candidates
tend to have very similar platforms, converging on the opinion of the median voter.
However, there are many cases to which this observation does not apply. In the commercial
setting, introducing price competition has been shown to cause competitors to differentiate in
location [8, 30]. Additional factors with a dispersing affect include transportation costs [30],
congestion [1, 18, 32], and queues [26, 33]. Nevertheless, those considerations do not apply to
the political setting, and explaining how a polarized political space may emerge [21] remains a
limitation of Hotelling’s model. Our motivating question in this paper concerns identifying and
understanding some of the factors of the Hotelling game that drive competitors to disperse rather
then cluster together. Our results provide a possible explanation of why in some settings it would
pay off for political candidates or firms to diverge from their competition.
The model we study is motivated by the following insightful observation, pointed out by several
other authors [16, 34, 3]. One of the key assumptions at the basis of the Hotelling model is that
clients will always go to the closest vendor, no matter how far he is. This assumption might be
problematic in some settings. In the political context, for instance, the assumption means that
voters may be willing to compromise their beliefs to an unlimited extent. In reality, this is not
necessarily valid; it is possible that if no candidate presents sufficiently close opinions, the voter
may simply abstain from voting.
To address this issue, we adopt a modified variant of the Hotelling game, introduced and
studied in [16, 34, 3], in which clients (voters, in the political context) have a limited tolerance
interval, and a client will choose only players (candidates, in the political context) that fall within
her tolerance interval. In our model the interval boundaries are chosen randomly, as each client
has a different tolerance threshold (reflecting, e.g., different degrees of openness to other political
views).
It is important to note that our model deviates from the previous models in two central
ways. First, in our game, the player that the client chooses from among the eligible players
(falling within her tolerance interval) is not arbitrary but rather the closest one (breaking ties
uniformly at random). This expresses the intuition that while a voter may be open minded and
willing to vote to a candidate with a vastly divergent standpoint, she would still rather vote to a
candidate that closely agrees with her own opinions provided one exists. Similarly, the proverbial
sunbather would prefer to visit a closer vendor, even if she is willing to travel a longer distance
when necessary. In this sense, our model maintains Hotelling’s original intuition while capturing
the realization that clients would not choose players that are too distant.
The second difference between our model and previous ones has to do with symmetry. Recently,
a growing concern for the political discourse in western democracies is the phenomenon of echo
1In the introduction, we use the noun “he” for players, and “she” for clients.
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chambers [21], namely, social media settings such as discussion groups and forums, in which one
is exposed exclusively to opinions that agree with, and enhance, her own2. This phenomenon
tends to “shorten” the tolerance intervals of individual voters. But more importantly, we note
that the echo chamber effect is very likely to act in a one-sided manner, making a voter more
receptive to views on one side of the political spectrum than the other. Hence in certain settings,
it is unreasonable to assume that a client has the same tolerance bounds on both sides.
To take such settings into account, we consider two variants of the game: symmetric games,
where clients have the same range of tolerance to their left and right, which expresses the willing-
ness of a client to go a certain distance, with no preference of direction, and asymmetric games,
where the left and right ranges of each client are determined independently of each other, which
captures settings where the scope of views each client is exposed to may be biased due to media
bias, one-sided echo chambers, or tendencies in her local environment.
It may be natural to expect our results to depend heavily on the distribution according to
which client tolerances are chosen. Surprisingly, it turns out that most of our general findings
apply to a wide class of distributions.
1.2 Contributions
In our model, the left and right tolerance ranges of each client are randomly distributed according
to a given density f . Hence a game G(n, f) is determined by the number of players n and the
distribution function f . We consider two variants: symmetric ranges and asymmetric ranges. In
a symmetric game the left and right ranges of each client are equal, whereas in an asymmetric
game the left and right ranges of each client are independent and identically distributed random
variables.
We start by characterizing the Nash equilibria of the 2-player game (Theorem 3.6). For n ≥ 3,
we identify a specific class of strategy profiles, referred to as canonical profiles, where the distance
between every pair of neighboring players is constant, and the distance from the leftmost player
to 0 (a.k.a. the left hinterland) is the same as the distance from the rightmost player to 1 (the
right hinterland).
We then show that canonical profiles are the only ones that may yield Nash equilibria in our
game, namely, if there is an equilibrium then it must be canonical (Theorem 3.8). Moreover, the
canonical profile, when it exists, is uniquely defined for every n and f . Hence, given a specific
game G(n, f), our problem is reduced to considering whether the canonical profile is a Nash
equilibrium for given values of n and f .
In the symmetric setting we give simple conditions for the canonical profile to be a Nash equi-
librium, and demonstrate their application for several distributions. In the asymmetric setting,
the conditions for equilibria are more complex, but we show that for some distributions, existence
2There are several reasons this phenomenon is increasingly prevalent online. First, exposure to content is curated
by algorithms according to each user’s personal preferences. Second, on social media, users are more likely to share
with their network content that agrees with their own opinion. Third, it has become increasingly easier to join
private discussion groups that consist of like-minded individuals.
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of a Nash equilibrium in the symmetric setting implies its existence in the asymmetric setting
(Theorem 5.6). Finally, we show that even though Theorem 5.6 does not apply for the exponential
distribution, it is still possible to derive a full characterization of its Nash equilibria. Specifically,
for the exponential distribution of parameter λ in the asymmetric setting, we show that a Nash
equilibrium exists for the n-player game if and only if λ ≥ λmin(n), for some threshold function
λmin(n) (Theorem 5.8). Additionally, we show a way to efficiently approximate the values of
λmin(n) to any precision.
1.3 Related Work
Hotelling’s model and its many variants have been studied extensively. Downs [10] extended
the Hotelling model to ideological positioning in a bipartisan democracy. It is remarkable to
note that even in Downs’ original work it was stipulated that extremists would rather abstain
than vote to center parties, but no mathematical framework was provided for this property of
the model. Our work formalizes Downs’ original intuition. Eaton and Lipsey [11] extended
Hotelling’s analysis to any number of players and different location spaces. Our model is a
direct extension of their n-player game on the line segment. d’Aspremont et al. [8] criticized
Hotelling’s findings and showed that when players compete on price as well as location, they tend
to create distance from one another, otherwise price competition would drop their profit to zero.
Our results show a differentiation in location in the n-player Hotelling game without introducing
price competition. A large portion of the Hotelling game literature is dedicated to models with
price competition. We, however, exclusively consider pure location competition models since they
apply more directly to certain settings, such as the political one. Eiselt, Laporte and Thisse [13]
provide an extensive comparison of the different models classified by the following characteristics:
the number of players, the location space (e.g., circle, plane, network), the pricing policy, the
behavior of players, and the behavior of clients. (For more recent surveys see Eiselt et al. [12]
and Brenner [4].) Osborne et al. [29] showed that in many variants of the political setting, no
Nash equilibrium exists for more than 2 players. In our model a Nash equilibrium exists for any
number of players.
Randomness in client behavior was introduced by De Palma et al. [9]. Their model assumes
client behavior has an unpredictable component due to unquantifiable factors of personal taste,
and thus clients have a small probability of “skipping” the closest player and buying from an-
other. In their model, all players would locate at the center in equilibrium, reasserting Hotelling’s
conclusion. In our model, clients exhibit randomness in their choice of players as well, but in
equilibrium players create a fixed distance from their neighbors.
Several recent works [16, 34, 3] studied the Hotelling model with limited attraction. Feldman
et al. [16] introduced the Hotelling model with limited attraction, where, similarly to our model,
clients are unwilling to travel beyond a certain distance. They considered a simplified variant of
the model where each player has an attraction interval of width w for some fixed w. Their model
admits an equilibrium for any number of players. Moreover, for most values of w, there exist
infinitely many equilibria. (In contrast, our model admits at most a single Nash equilibrium with
a distinct structure.) Shen and Wang [34] extend the model of [16] to general distributions of
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clients. Ben-Porat and Tennenholz [3] consider random ranges of tolerance, and show that their
game behaves like a cooperative game, since player payoffs are equal to their Shapley values in
a coalition game. Their analysis relies on the fact that their game is a potential game, which
does not hold for our model. As explained above, our model diverges from these studies in other
ways. In particular, in our model, clients are not allowed to “skip” over players, and must choose
the closest player within their tolerance interval, whereas the previous studies assume clients are
indifferent between players within their range of tolerance. Also, our model introduces the notion
of asymmetric ranges of tolerance, which has not been considered before.
2 Model
Consider a setting in which clients are uniformly distributed along the interval [0, 1]. A client
is represented as a point v ∈ [0, 1], denoting her preference along the interval [0, 1]. Clients are
non-strategic.
The strategic interaction in our model occurs between a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of players.
The set of strategies for a player is to choose a point in the interval [0, 1]. Let si ∈ [0, 1] denote
the strategy of player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A strategy profile is given by a vector of player locations
s = (s1, . . . , sn). Let s−i denote the profile of actions of all the players different from i. Slightly
abusing notation, we denote by (s′i, s−i) the profile obtained from a profile s by replacing its ith
coordinate si with s
′
i. We assume without loss of generality that 0 ≤ s1 ≤ · · · ≤ sn ≤ 1. For the
sake of notational convenience, we denote s0 = 0 and sn+1 = 1.
Each client v has left and right ranges of tolerance denoted BRv and B
L
v respectively. The
tolerance interval of client v is defined as Iv = [v−BLv , v+BRv ]. The client v supports the closest
player within its tolerance interval. If there exists more than one closest player, then v chooses
one of the closest players uniformly at random. Formally, X(s) = {si | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} is the set of
locations occupied by a player under s. For every client v the set of occupied locations inside
v’s tolerance interval is denoted Tv(s) = X(s) ∩ Iv. Let Av(s) = arg minx∈Tv(s) |x − v| be the
location v is attracted to. This set contains at most two locations, one to each side of v, but it
is convenient to break ties by selecting the location on the left3, i.e., if Av(s) = {si, sj} such that
si < sj , we modify Av(s) to be {si}. For every player i and location x, the attraction of v to
location x ∈ X(s) is given by
ωv,x(s) = Pr [v is attracted to a player in location x] = Pr [{x} = Av(s)] .
We consider BRv , B
L
v to be non-negative random variables drawn from the same distribution D
independently for all clients v. We consider two variants of the game: symmetric and asymmetric.
In the symmetric variant, BRv = B
L
v , for every client v. In the asymmetric variant, B
R
v and B
L
v
are independent identically distributed random variables, for every client v. Throughout the
paper, we denote by f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] the probability density function of D, and the cumulative
3There are at most n − 2 points which are at equal distances from the nearest player on the right and on the
left, and given that there is a continuum of clients in total, modifying Av(s) in those points does not affect player
utilities.
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distribution function is denoted as F : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. That is, F (t) = Pr[BRv ≤ t] = Pr[BRt ≤ t].
Additionally, for the analysis it is convenient to define F¯ (t) = 1− F (t) = Pr[BRt ≥ t].
Given a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn), two players i, j ∈ N are said to be colocated if si = sj .
For i ∈ N , the set of i’s colocated players is defined as Γi = {j ∈ N | sj = si}, and the size
of this set is γi = |Γi|. A player that is not colocated with other players is called isolated. Two
players are called neighbors if no player is located strictly between them. A left (resp., right)
peripheral player is a player that has no players to its left (resp., right). The players divide the
line into regions of two types: internal regions, which are regions between two neighbors, and
two hinterlands, which include the region between 0 and the left peripheral player, and the region
between the right peripheral player and 1. (See Figure 1, where the two hinterlands are marked
by a.)
For i ∈ N , player i’s left and right neighbors are L(si) = maxx∈X(s){x < si} and R(sj) =
minx∈X(s){x > si}, respectively. Namely, these are the closest occupied player locations on either
side of player i. We define L(si) = 0 when i does not have a left neighbor and R(si) = 1 when i
does not have a right neighbor. Define the total utility at the location of player i as
Ui(s) = U
L
i (s) + U
R
i (s) =
∫ R(si)
L(si)
ωv,si(s)dv ,
where ULi (s) and U
R
i (s) are the left and right total utilities at player i’s location,
ULi (s) =
∫ si
L(si)
ωv,si(s)dv and U
R
i (s) =
∫ R(si)
si
ωv,si(s)dv .
The total utility of player i represents the total amount of clients attracted to location si (either
to player i itself or to some colocated player j ∈ Γi).
The utility, left utility and right utility of player i are defined to be
ui(s) = u
L
i (s) + u
R
i (s) =
Ui(s)
γi
, uLi (s) =
ULi (s)
γi
and uRi (s) =
URi (s)
γi
.
To summarize, our game is fully defined by the number of players n, the probability density
function of client tolerances f , and whether the setting symmetric or asymmetric. Let GS =
GS(n, f) be the game under the symmetric setting, and let GA = GA(n, f) be the game under the
asymmetric setting. When making a claim that applies to both the symmetric and asymmetric
setting we will use the notation G = G(n, f).
Given a profile s, s′i ∈ [0, 1] is an improving move for player i if ui(s′i, s−i) > ui(s). s∗i ∈ [0, 1]
is a best response for player i if ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i) for every s′i ∈ [0, 1].
A profile s∗ is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an improving move, i.e., for every i ∈ N
and every si ∈ [0, 1], ui(s∗) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i).
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3 Canonical Profiles as the only Possible Equilibria
In this section we characterize a specific class of strategy profiles, referred to as canonical profiles,
and show that these profiles are the only ones that may yield Nash equilibria in our game (namely,
if there is an equilibrium then it must be canonical). We then show that each game G(n, f)
admits a unique canonical profile, sn,f , if one exists. This significantly simplifies later analysis
and explains why the game presents similar behavior for every number of players n ≥ 3. We
conclude this section with a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a given canonical profile
to be a Nash equilibrium. Consequently, for every subclass of the game considered in the following
sections, it suffices to consider these conditions to either find the entire set of Nash equilibria of
a game G(n, f) provided one exists, or prove that the game admits no Nash equilibrium.
3.1 Calculating Utilities
Note that the utilities in our game are locally defined, i.e., the utility of player i is independent of
the location of players outside the interval [L(si), R(si)]. This is due to fact that a player i may
only attract clients from within i’s adjacent regions. Moreover, the attraction ωv,si of a client
v ∈ [L(si), R(si)] to the location of player i depends only on the distance |v − si|, the length of
the region v is inside, and whether it is a hinterland or an internal region.
It follows that the game G(n, f) is uniquely determined by the following two functions:
H(x) =
∫ x
0
Pr
[
BRt ≥ t
]
dt (1)
M(x) =
∫ x
2
0
Pr
[
BLt ≥ t
]
dt+
∫ x
x
2
Pr
[
BLt ≥ t ∧ BRt < x− t
]
dt (2)
Intuitively, H(x) (respectively, M(x)) denotes the expected amount of support an isolated
player gains from a hinterland (resp., an internal region) of length x. Note that in the symmetric
setting, we have that BLv = B
R
v for every client v ∈ [0, 1] and therefore, for every t ∈ [x/2, x],
Pr[BLt ≥ t ∧ BRt < x− t] = 0 .
However, in the asymmetric setting, BLv and B
R
v are independent random variables and thus
Pr[BLt ≥ t ∧ BRt < x− t] = Pr[BLt ≥ t] · Pr[BRt < x− t] .
Recalling that F (t) = Pr[BRt ≤ t] the next observation follows.
Observation 3.1. For a symmetric game GS(n, f), the functions H and M are
H(x) =
∫ x
0
(1− F (t))dt (3)
M(x) =
∫ x
2
0
(1− F (t))dt (4)
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For an asymmetric game GS(n, f), the functions H and M are
H(x) =
∫ x
0
(1− F (t))dt (5)
M(x) =
∫ x
2
0
(1− F (t))dt+
∫ x
x
2
(1− F (t))F (x− t)dt (6)
Recalling that both BLv and B
R
v are drawn from the same distribution for all v ∈ [0, 1], the
next claim follows by substituting variables in the integration.
Lemma 3.2. For any game G = G(n, f), profile s s.t. 0 ≤ s1 ≤ s2 ≤ · · · ≤ sn ≤ 1, and i ∈ N ,
ULi (s) =
{
H(si), i is left peripheral;
M(si − L(si)), otherwise.
and
URi (s) =
{
H(1− si), i is right peripheral;
M(R(si)− si), otherwise.
Note that since BLt and B
R
t are identically distributed for all t ∈ [0, 1], the functions H(x) and
M(x) do not depend on whether the player is incident to the left or to the right of the region in
question.
As an illustrative example, consider the profile s = (0.2, 0.5, 0.6) in a three player game G(3, f).
Then u1(s) = H(0.2) +M(0.3), u2(s) =M(0.3) +M(0.1) and u3(s) =M(0.1) +H(0.4).
It is possible to define any game G(n, f) by simply determining H(x) and M(x). In fact,
these functions may be used to define many other variants of the Hotelling model not considered
within the scope of this paper. Throughout this section, we will not use the explicit formulas for
H(x) and M(x) and our results do not depend on these formulas. Instead, we derive our results
based solely on the assumption that for the game under consideration, H(x) and M(x) satisfy
the following properties:
(HM1) Both functions H andM are twice differentiable, concave and monotonically increasing,
That is, for x ∈ [0, 1), H′(x) > 0, M′(x) > 0, H′′(x) < 0 and M′′(x) < 0.
(HM2) For x ∈ [0, 1], H(x) ≥M(x).
(HM3) H(0) =M(0) = 0 .
Therefore, our results in this section are general and apply to any game G(n, f) where (HM1),
(HM2) and (HM3) are satisfied.
3.2 Optimizing utilities locally
We next extablish the optimal (maximum-utility) location of each player i when fixing the loca-
tions of the other players and assuming i can only move between its neighbors, but not “jump”
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over a neighbor. Consider a peripheral player, and suppose its neighbor is at distance 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
from the endpoint. For 0 ≤ t ≤ x, denote by θx(t) the utility of a peripheral player when its
hinterland is of length t, and by µx(t) the utility of an internal player i with si − L(si) = t and
R(si)− L(si) = x. By Lemma 3.2,
θx(t) = H(t) +M(x− t) and µx(t) = M(t) +M(x− t)
for x ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ [0, x].
Remark. To keep θ and µ continuous in the interval [0, t], we disregard the fact that for x = t
and x = 0 the player is colocated with one of its neighbors, and assume all its payoff comes from
the same interval of length t. As shown in Claim 3.7, this assumption does not affect the analysis
of the Nash equilibria of the game.
Lemma 3.3. Let G be game satisfying (HM1), (HM2), (HM3). For x ∈ [0, 1],
(a) θx and µx are strictly concave functions of t.
(b) t = x/2 is the unique maximum of µx in [0, x].
(c) If H′(x) >M′(0), then θx is strictly increasing in [0, x].
(d) If H′(x) ≤ M′(0), then t∗ is the unique maximum of θx in [0, x], where t∗ is the unique
solution of the equation H′(t∗) =M′(x− t∗) .
Proof. (a) is immediate from the definitions of θx and µx and assumption (HM1).
(b) Since µx is concave, it has a unique maximum in every closed interval. Setting t = x/2 we
obtain
µ′x
(x
2
)
=M′′
(x
2
)
−M′′
(
x− x
2
)
= 0 ,
and thus µx is uniquely maximized at t = x/2.
(c) Since θx is concave, θ
′
x is monotone decreasing. Therefore, for all t ∈ [0, x],
θ′x(t) ≥ θ′x(x) = H′(x) +M′(0) > 0 .
(d) Note that for both (HM2) and (HM3) to hold we must have H′(0) ≥ M′(0), otherwise
H(ε) < M(ε) for sufficiently small ε > 0. It follows by the monotonicity of M′ that H′(0) ≥
M′(0) ≥ M′(x) . Hence, θ′x(0) ≥ 0. By assumption, θ′x(x) ≤ 0. So by the intermediate value
theorem there must exist t∗ ∈ [0, x] such that θ′x(t∗) = 0, i.e.,
H′(t∗) =M′(x− t∗) ,
and since θx is concave, it follows that t
∗ uniquely maximizes θx in the interval [0, x].
Let ρ(x) denote the unique maximum of θx in the interval [0, x]. By Lemma 3.3, the function
ρ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is well defined, and is given by
ρ(x) =
{
x, if H′(x) >M′(0);
t∗, if H′(x) ≤M′(0),
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where t∗ is the unique solution of H′(t∗) =M′(x− t∗). We next show several properties of ρ(x)
that will be used in the proofs of our main results.
Lemma 3.4. Let x < y, for x, y ∈ [0, 1]. Then
(a) If H′(x) ≤M′(0), then H′(ρ(x)) ≤M′(0).
(b) ρ(x) ≤ ρ(y).
(c) θx(ρ(x)) ≤ θy(ρ(y)).
Proof. (a) Since H′(x) ≤M′(0), by Lemma 3.3, it holds that H′(ρ(x)) =M′(x− ρ(x)). Further-
more, M′ is monotone decreasing, so the claim follows.
(b) If H′(y) > M′(0), then by Lemma 3.3, ρ(y) = y. But ρ(x) ≤ x < y = ρ(y), so the claim
holds.
Next, suppose H′(y) ≤M′(0). Assume towards contradiction that ρ(x) > ρ(y). Since x < y,
it follows that x− ρ(x) < y− ρ(y). Therefore, since H′ andM′ are monotonically decreasing, we
have that
H′(ρ(x)) < H′(ρ(y)) and M′(x− ρ(x)) >M′(y − ρ(y)) . (7)
Moreover, H′(y) ≤M′(0), so by definition of ρ we have that
H′(ρ(y)) =M′(y − ρ(y)) .
Plugging this into Eq. (7), we obtain
H′(ρ(x)) <M′(x− ρ(x)) ,
which is a contradiction to the definition of ρ (in both of its cases).
(c) Since the function θy is maximized at ρ(y), we have that
θy(ρ(y)) = H(ρ(y)) +M(y − ρ(y)) ≥ H(ρ(x)) +M(y − ρ(x)) = θy(ρ(x)) .
But M is monotone increasing and y > x, so it follows that
θy(ρ(y)) ≥ H(ρ(x)) +M(x− ρ(x)) = θx(ρ(x)) .
3.3 Nash Equilibria
Let us now characterize the stable profiles that lead to a Nash equilibrium for a given game
G(n, f).
The pair 〈a, b〉, a, b ∈ [0, 1], is called a canonical pair if a and b satisfy the following equations:
H′(a) =M′(b) (8)
2a+ (n− 1)b = 1 (9)
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Note that the canonical pair is unique for n and λ (if it exists at all). A canonical pair induces a
profile sn,f for the game G(n, f), such that
sn,fi = a+ (i− 1)b
for every i ∈ N (see Figure 1). We refer to this profile as a canonical profile.
0 𝑠1
𝑛,𝑓 . . . . . . . . . 
𝑎 𝑎𝑏 𝑏 𝑏 𝑏
1𝑠2
𝑛,𝑓 𝑠3
𝑛,𝑓 𝑠𝑛
𝑛,𝑓
Figure 1: a canonical profile.
Lemma 3.5. A game G satisfying (HM1), (HM2), (HM3) has a canonical pair if and only if
H′(1/2) ≤M′(0). Moreover, if such a pair exists then it is unique.
Proof. Let H′(1/2) >M′(0), and assume towards contradiction that a canonical pair 〈a, b〉 exists.
Note that a ≤ 1/2 and b ≥ 0 due to Eq. (9). Hence, since H′ and M′ are monotone decreasing,
it follows that H′(a) ≥ H′(1/2) >M′(0) ≥ M′(b), in contradiction to Eq. (8). This shows that
no canonical pair exists if H′(1/2) >M′(0).
Let H′(1/2) ≤M′(0). We show that a canonical pair 〈a, b〉 exists. Note that for both (HM2)
and (HM3) to hold we must have H′(0) ≥ M′(0), since otherwise H(ε) <M(ε) for sufficiently
small ε > 0. Hence, by the monotonicity of M′,
H′(0) ≥M′(0) ≥M′
(
1
n− 1
)
. (10)
Consider the function g(x) = H′(x) −M′(1−2xn−1 ). By the assumption that H′(1/2) ≤ M′(0), we
have that g(1/2) ≤ 0, and by Eq. (10), it holds that g(0) ≥ 0. Hence, by the intermediate value
theorem there exists x ∈ [0, 1] such that g(x) = 0. Thus, by definition, 〈x, 1−2xn−1 〉 is a canonical
pair. This shows that a canonical pair exists. It remains to show uniqueness.
Assume towards contradiction that 〈a, b〉 and 〈a′, b′〉 are both canonical pairs, such that a′ < a.
By Eq. (8),
H′(a) =M′(b) and H′(a′) =M′(b′) . (11)
Since a′ < a, by Eq. (9), it follows that b′ > b. H′ and M′ are strictly decreasing functions, so
H′(a) < H′(a′) and M′(b) >M′(b′) ,
in contradiction to Eq. (11). Therefore a′ = a, which in turn ensures that also b′ = b. This shows
that the canonical pair is unique, and concludes the proof of the claim.
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Theorem 3.6. Let G be a game satisfying (HM1),(HM2) and (HM3), and let n = 2. The game
G has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is given by
s∗ =
{
sn,f , if H′(1/2) ≤M′(0);(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, otherwise.
Proof. Let (s1, s2) be a Nash equilibrium of the game. First note that s1 ≤ 1/2, otherwise player 2
can improve its payoff by relocating to 1−s2 (due to the monotonicity H andM). Symmetrically,
we also have s2 ≥ 1/2.
Consider the case where H′(1/2) >M′(0), and suppose that s2 > 1/2. We have that s1 ≤ 1/2,
so it follows from the monotonicity of H′ and M′ that H′(s1) ≥ H′(1/2) >M′(0) ≥M′(s2 − s).
Therefore, by definition, θs2(s1) > 0. It follows by Lemma 3.3 that ρ(s2), the optimal location
within the interval [0, s2], is not at s1, contradiction. So suppose s2 = 1/2 and thus H′(s2) >
M′(0). It follows, by Lemma 3.3, that the optimal location for player 1 is at s1 = 1/2.
Now consider the case where H′(1/2) ≤ M′(0). It follows that H′(s2) ≤ M′(0) and H′(1 −
s1) ≤M′(0), and thus by Lemma 3.3, we get
H′(s1) =M′(s2 − s1) and H′(1− s2) =M′(s2 − s1) ,
which yields H′(s1) = H′(1 − s2), and therefore s1 = 1 − s2, due to the monotonicity of H′.
It follows that (x1, x2) is the canonical profile s
n,f . We have shown that each player cannot
improve locally, it remains to show each player cannot improve by moving to the other hinterland.
Consider player 1 relocating to segment [s2, 1]. By Claim 3.4(c), since s2 > 1/2, we have that
θ1−s2(ρ(1 − s2)) ≤ θs2(ρ(s2)), and thus the optimal location in [s2, 1] is not an improving move
for player 1. This shows that player 1 has no improving move. Symmetrically, player 2 has no
improving move, so this is a Nash equilibrium. Uniqueness follows from the uniqueness of the
canonical pair (Lemma 3.5).
For n ≥ 3 players, we show that the only possible Nash equilibrium is the canonical profile.
Towards proving Theorem 3.8, we state the following claim.
Lemma 3.7. Let G be a game satisfying (HM1),(HM2) and (HM3), and let n ≥ 3. If s is a Nash
equilibrium then no two players are colocated in s.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that there exist players i, i + 1, . . . , i + k such that si−1 <
si = si+1 = · · · = si+k < si+k+1 for k ≥ 1. Suppose at first that these are internal players, i.e.,
s1 < si < sn. Hence, by Lemma 3.2 the utility of i is given by
ui(s) =
M(si − si−1) +M(si+k+1 − si)
k + 1
.
Assume without loss of generality that M(si − si−1) ≥M(si+k+1 − si). Note that
max(M(si − si−1),M(si+k+1 − si)) ≥ M(si − si−1) +M(si+k+1 − si)
2
.
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Therefore, if k > 1 orM(si− si−1) 6=M(si+k+1− si), then si− ε is an improving move for player
i, for sufficiently small ε > 0. We may thus assume that k = 1 and M(si − si−1) =M(si+2 − si)
and thus ui(s) =M(si−si−1). ButM is a concave function soM(si−si−1) ≤ 2M((si−si−1)/2).
Therefore (si + si−1)/2 is an improving move for player i, contradicting the assumption. We have
shown that no Nash equilibrium s has colocated internal players. We next consider peripheral
players.
Suppose now that i = 1, that is, s1 = s2 = · · · = sk+1 < sk+2 for k < n−1 (i.e., not all players
are colocated). Then by Lemma 3.2 the utility of player k + 1 is given by
uk+1(s) =
H(sk+1) +M(sk+2 − sk+1)
k + 1
.
As in the previous case, if k > 1 or H(sk+1) 6= M(sk+2 − s1), then player 1 has an improving
move. Hence, we assume k = 1 and H(s2) =M(s3 − s2). Therefore, u2(s) =M(s3 − s2), and as
above it follows from the concavity of M that (s3 + s2)/2 is a local improving move for player 2.
The only case left to consider is when all players are collocated at the same location, i.e.,
s1 = s2 = · · · = sn. Then by Lemma 3.2 the utility of player 1 is given by
u1(s) =
H(s1) +H(1− s1)
n
.
Since n > 2, as in both previous cases player 1 can improve by moving to s1 + ε for small enough
ε > 0. The claim follows.
Theorem 3.8. Let G be a game satisfying (HM1),(HM2) and (HM3), and let n ≥ 3. If the game
G admits a Nash equilibrium, then it is unique and equal to the canonical profile sn,f .
Proof. By Lemma 3.7, no two players are colocated in s. Our proof relies on local optimization of
the location of each player. Assume towards contradiction that H′(1/2) >M′(0). By Lemma 3.3,
it follows that u1, the utility of player 1, is an increasing function in the interval [0, s2] with
respect to s1, hence (s1 + s2)/2 is an improving move for player 1, in contradiction to s being an
equilibrium. Thus, it must hold that H′(1/2) ≤M′(0) .
Note that s1 ≤ 1/2, otherwise player 2 can improve its payoff by relocating to 1− s2 (due to
the monotonicity H and M). Symmetrically, we also have s2 ≥ 1/2. Thus, by Lemma 3.3, we
have that
H′(s1) =M′(s2 − s1) and H′(1− sn) =M′(sn − sn−1) . (12)
Additionally, by Lemma 3.3, we have that the optimal location of each internal player i ∈
{2, . . . , n − 1} is at si = (si−1 + si+1)/2. Consequently, there exists a constant b such that
s2 − s1 = s3 − s2 = · · · = sn − sn−1 = b. Pluggin s2 − s1 = sn − sn−1 into Eq. (12) we obtain
H′(s1) = H′(1− sn) ,
and H′ is monotone decreasing since H is concave, so we get s1 = 1− sn = a, proving that s is a
canonical profile. Uniqueness follows from Lemma 3.5.
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Lemma 3.9. Let G be a game satisfying (HM1),(HM2) and (HM3), and let n ≥ 3. Let sn,f be the
canonical profile of G, with a corresponding canonical pair 〈a, b〉. Then sn,f is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if
H(a) +M(b) ≥ 2M
(
b
2
)
, (13)
H(ρ(a)) +M(a− ρ(a)) ≤ 2M(b) . (14)
Proof. By Lemma 3.3 we have that in each region there is one point that maximizes the payoff.
Moreover, by Lemma 3.7 the payoff gained from colocating with another player j can always
be exceeded by that of an isolated location within one of j’s adjacent regions. Therefore, the
canonical profile sn,f is a Nash equilibrium if and only if relocating to the optimal location of any
region is not an improving move for any player i.
Note that sn,f is constructed such that no player i can improve by moving to one of its adjacent
regions, so it remains to consider whether i can improve by moving to a non-adjacent region. It
is easy to see that no internal player has an improving move in an internal region and that no
peripheral player has an improving move in the other hinterland (due to the monotonicity of H
and M).
Let us consider the possibility that the peripheral player 1 has an improving move in an
internal region. By Lemma 3.2, we have that u1(s
n,f ) = H(a) +M(b), and by Lemma 3.3 the
optimal utility player 1 would gain by relocating to an internal segment is 2M(b/2). It follows
that if Eq. (13) holds, then player 1 has no improving move.
We next consider whether an internal player i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1} has an improving move in
the hinterland. By Lemma 3.2, we have that ui(s
n,f ) = 2M(b), and by Lemma 3.3 the optimal
utility player 1 would gain by relocating to a hinterland is H(ρ(a)) +M(a− ρ(a)). It follows that
if Eq. (14) holds, then player i has no improving move. This shows that Eq. (13) and (14) are
necessary and sufficient conditions for the canonical profile sn,f to be a Nash equilibrium.
4 Symmetric Range Distributions
In this section we consider the symmetric game GS(n, f), where the range of each client v satisfies
BLv = B
R
v . We first show that the game satisfies assumptions (HM1), (HM2) and (HM3), which
allows us to use all the results of Section 3.
4.1 General Properties
Recall that F¯ (t) = 1− F (t), where F is the cumulative distribution function of f .
Lemma 4.1. Let GS(n, f) be a game such that f is continuously differentiable and has full
support (i.e., f(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]), then GS(n, f) satisfies assumptions (HM1), (HM2) and
(HM3).
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Proof. (HM2) and (HM3) follow immediately from Observation 3.1, so it remains to show (HM1).
Note that by Observation 3.1, we have that M(x) = H(x/2) for every x ∈ [0, 1], so it suffices to
show that H is increasing and concave. By the fundamental theorem of calculus we obtain
H′(x) = 1− F (x) ,
which is strictly positive due to the fact that f(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1) and thus not all of the
mass of the distribution is contained in [0, x]. This shows that H is increasing.
We next show H is concave. By definition of F , the second derivative is
H′′(x) = −f(x) ,
which is strictly negative by the assumption on f . It follows that H is concave. This proves the
lemma.
Due to Lemma 4.1, we may apply Theorem 3.6 and Theorem 3.8 to the game GS(n, f) and
we thus obtain the following two corollaries.
Corollary 4.2. Let n = 2, and let f be continuously differentiable and have full support (i.e.,
f(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]). Then the game GS(2, f) has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is
given by
s∗ =
{
sn,f , if F¯ (1/2) ≤ 1/2;(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, otherwise,
where sn,f is the canonical profile, with a corresponding canonical pair 〈a, b〉, where a and b are
given implicitly by the equation F¯ (a) = F¯ (b/2)/2 .
Corollary 4.3. Let n ≥ 3. For every game GS(n, f) where f is continuously differentiable and
has full support (i.e., f(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]), if GS admits a Nash equilibrium then it is
unique (up to renaming the players) and equal to the canonical profile sn,f , with a corresponding
canonical pair 〈a, b〉, where a and b are given implicitly by the equation F¯ (a) = F¯ (b/2)/2 .
Lemma 4.4. Under the symmetric game GS(n, f), the function ρ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] satisfies that
ρ(x) > x/3, for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Recall that ρ(x) = arg maxy∈[0,x] θx(y). Furthermore, by Lemma 3.3, θx is concave, so it
follows that if θ′x(y) ≥ 0, (i.e., θx is non-decreasing at the point y) then ρ(x) ≥ y. Thus, it suffices
to show that θx(x/3) ≥ 0 for every x ∈ [0, 1]. Plugging Eq. (3) and (4) into the definition of θx
we obtain
θx(y) =
∫ y
0
(1− F (t))dt+
∫ x−y
2
0
(1− F (t))dt .
By the fundamental theorem of calculus, the derivative with respect to y is given by
θ′x(y) = 1− F (y)−
1
2
(
1− F
(
x− y
2
))
.
Plugging in y = x/3 yields
θ′x
(x
3
)
= 1− F
(x
3
)
− 1
2
(
1− F
(x
3
))
=
1
2
(
1− F
(x
3
))
≥ 0 .
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This proves the claim.
Lemma 4.5. The game GS(n, f) as in Lemma 4.1, for n ≥ 3, admits a Nash equilibrium if and
only if
H(ρ(a)) +M(a− ρ(a)) ≤ 2M(b) ,
where ρ(a) is defined implicitly by the equation F¯ (ρ(a)) = F¯ ((a− ρ(a))/2)/2.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, GS(n, f) satisfies assumptions (HM1), (HM2) and (HM3). Therefore, by
Lemma 3.9, GS(n, f) admits a Nash equilibrium if and only if Eq. (13) and (14) are satisfied.
Recall that by the definition of the canonical profile, a is the optimal location for player 1 within
the interval [0, a+ b], i.e., ρ(a+ b) = a. Thus, by Lemma 4.4, it follows that a ≥ (a+ b)/3, which
yields a ≥ b/2. by assumption (HM2) and the monotonicity of H and M, we obtain
H(a) +M(b) ≥M(a) +M(b) ≥ 2M
(
b
2
)
Thus, Eq. (13) always holds in the symmetric setting. Hence, the game admits a Nash equilibrium
if and only if Eq. (14) is satisfied. The lemma follows.
We conclude the discussion of symmetric games with a number of example distributions and
their equilibria states.
4.2 Example 1: The Uniform Distribution
This distribution, in which the range boundary parameter BLv (= B
R
v ) is drawn uniformly at
random from [0, 1], was considered by Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz [3] in a setting where clients
are allowed to skip over players. Here we show that, if “skipping” is not allowed, as in our model,
there is no Nash equilibrium for n ≥ 3. For n = 2, the only Nash equilibrium is (1/2, 1/2), where
both players are colocated at the center. The probability density function and corresponding
cumulative density function are defined as
f(x) =
{
1, x ∈ [0, 1];
0, otherwise,
F (x) =

x, x ∈ [0, 1];
1, x ≥ 1;
0, otherwise.
Proposition 4.6. For the game GS(n, f), where f is the uniform distribution, there exists a
Nash equilibrium if and only if n = 2, and it is equal to the strategy profile (1/2, 1/2).
Proof. Plugging f into Corollary 4.3, we get that the only Nash equilibrium of GS(n, f) is the
canonical profile represented by the canonical pair 〈a, b〉 where a and b satisfy 1−a = (1− b/2)/2
By definition, the canonical pair additionally satisfies 2a + (n − 1)b = 1. So the only solution is
a = 1/2 and b = 0. Hence, GS(n, f) has a Nash equilibrium if and only if n = 2.
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4.3 Example 2: Linear Distributions
Here we consider any distribution whose density is linear and whose mass is entirely contained in
[0, 1]. Specifically, assume
∫ 1
0 (rx+ q)dx = 1, or rather q = 1− r/2. For f(x) to be non-negative
in [0, 1] we also need −2 ≤ r ≤ 2. Then take
f(x) =
{
rx+ q, x ∈ [0, 1];
0, otherwise,
F (x) =

r
2x
2 + qx, x ∈ [0, 1];
1, x ≥ 1;
0, otherwise.
To make the analysis cleaner let us pick the two extreme examples of the parameters (r, q), namely,
(−2, 2) and (2, 0).
Proposition 4.7. The game GS(n, f), where f is the linear distribution with coefficients either
(r1, q1) = (−2, 2) or (r2, q2) = (2, 0), has a Nash equilibrium if and only if n = 2.
(a) For r1, q1, the only Nash equilibrium is (1/2,1/2).
(b) For r2, q2, the only (canonical) Nash equilibrium is given by the canonical pair
a =
2
√
2 + 1
2
√
2 + 2
and b =
√
2− 1
1 + 1/
√
2
.
Proof. For r2, q2 we get that F¯ (1/2) > 1/2 and thus by Corollaries 4.2 and 4.3 the only Nash
equilibrium is (1/2, 1/2) when n = 2.
For r1, q1 we get the equation (1− a)2 = 12(1− b/2)2, which yields
a =
2(
√
2− 1)n− 2√2 + 3
2
√
2(n− 1) + 2 and b =
√
2− 1
n− 1 + 1/√2 .
If n = 2, a Nash equilibrium always exists, so this is a Nash equilibrium. For n ≥ 3, by
Lemma 4.5 this is a Nash equilibrium if for every x in [0, a] we have(
1− a− x
2
)3
+ (1− x)3 ≥ 2
(
1− b
2
)3
. (15)
But a ≥ 2b so we can choose x such that x ≥ b/2 and (a − x)/2 ≥ b/2, making the left hand
side of Ineq. (15) strictly smaller than the right hand side, contradiction. Hence there is no Nash
equilibrium.
Remark. Intuitively, in the uniform distribution the players are forced to converge towards the
center. In comparison, in the linear distribution corresponding to (r2, q2) it is likelier for clients
to have a large range, which means more clients inside the hinterland will be covered by the
peripheral player, so it will be beneficial for it to move closer to its neighbor and have fewer
clients contested by another player, despite having a greater average distance to potential clients.
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4.4 Example 3: Pareto Distributions
The distribution Pareto(α, ξ) for parameters α > 0 and ξ > 0 has density function and cumulative
distribution function
f(x) =
{
0, x < ξ ;
αξα
xα+1
, x ≥ ξ , F (x) =
{
0, x < ξ ;
1− (ξ/x)α , x ≥ ξ .
Proposition 4.8. For the game GS(n, f), where f is the density of Pareto(α, ξ), the canonical
pair is given by
a =
21/α−1
n− 1 + 21/α and b =
1
n− 1 + 21/α , (16)
and it is a Nash equilibrium if and only if α ≥ z, where z is the unique solution of the equation
21/z(2 + 21/z)z = 8 such that 0 < z < 1.
Proof. Note that f(x) = 0 for x ∈ [0, ξ) so the conditions of Corollary 4.3 do not apply. However,
for ξ small enough the result still holds.4 The equation F¯ (a) = F¯ (b/2)/2 yields(
ξ
a
)α
=
1
2
(
2ξ
b
)α
,
which translates to a = 21/α−1b. By definition the canonical pair satisfies 2a + (n − 1)b = 1. So
we get
a =
21/α−1
n− 1 + 21/α and b =
1
n− 1 + 21/α . (17)
To apply Lemma 4.5 we first calculate
∫ x
0
F¯ (t)dt =

ξ + ξ ln
(
x
ξ
)
, α = 1 ;
ξ + ξα−1
(
1−
(
ξ
x
)α−1)
, α 6= 1 .
Let x∗ ∈ [0, a] satisfy
F¯ (x∗) = F¯ ((a− x∗)/2)/2.
This solves to
x∗ =
21/αa
2 + 21/α
and
a− x∗
2
=
a
2 + 21/α
(18)
Consider α = 1 first. Note that in this case, a = b and x∗ = a/2, so the condition given in
Lemma 4.5 translates to ∫ a
2
a
4
F¯ (t)dt ≥
∫ a
2
a
2
F¯ (t)dt .
4The Theorem does not hold in cases where b < 2ξ. This is due to the fact that all clients have a range of at
least ξ, and therefore the internal player gets the same utility at all points of the interval between its neighbors.
But in such cases an internal player would have an improving move in the hinterlands, so the canonical profile is
not an equilibrium anyway.
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This always holds since the left hand side is non-negative and the right hand side is zero. So we
have that for α = 1 the canonical pair is 〈 1n+1 , 1n+1〉 and it is a Nash equilibrium.
Let us now consider α 6= 1. By Lemma 4.5 the canonical profile given in (17) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if
ξ
α− 1
((
2ξ
a− x∗
)α−1
−
(
2ξ
b
)α−1)
≥ ξ
α− 1
((
2ξ
b
)α−1
−
(
ξ
x∗
)α−1)
.
Rearranging, we obtain
1
α− 1
((
2
a− x∗
)α−1
+
(
1
x∗
)α−1)
≥ 2
α− 1
(
2
b
)α−1
.
Plugging b = 21−1/αa and Eq. (18) in the above we get
1
α− 1
(2 + 21/α
a
)α−1
+
(
2 + 21/α
21/αa
)α−1 ≥ 2
α− 1
(
21/α
a
)α−1
.
Suppose α > 1. We get
(2 + 21/α)α−1
(
1
2(α−1)/α
+ 1
)
≥ 8 · 2−1/α
or 21/α(2 + 21/α)α ≥ 8. This inequality holds since equality holds for α = 1 and the left hand side
is a monotonically increasing function of α for α > 1.
Now consider α < 1. We get 21/α(2 + 21/α)α ≤ 8 . There exists a constant 0 < z < 1 such
that 21/z(2 + 21/z)z = 8. The inequality holds for α ∈ [z, 1].
To summarize, we have that for α ≥ z the game has a unique Nash equilibrium which is the
canonical profile given in Eq. (17).
4.5 Example 4: Exponential Distributions
The exponential distribution with parameter λ > 0 has density function and cumulative density
function
f(x) =
{
0, x < 0 ;
λe−λx, x ≥ 0 , F (x) =
{
0, x < 0 ;
1− e−λx, x ≥ 0 .
Proposition 4.9. For the game GS(n, f), where f is the density of the exponential distribution
with parameter λ > 0, the canonical pair is given by
a =
1
n
(
1
2
+
(n− 1) ln 2
λ
)
and b =
1
n
(
1− 2 ln 2
λ
)
and it is a Nash equilibrium if and only if λ ≥ ln 4− n ln(4τ61 ), where τ1 =
6√2+
√
64+ 3
√
2
8·25/6 ≈ 0.65.
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Proof. By Corollary 4.3 we have that the only Nash equilibrium of the game GS(n, f) is the
canonical pair 〈a, b〉 satisfying
e−λa = e−λb/2/2 ,
and thus a = b/2+ln 2/λ. By definition, a and b satisfy 2a+(n−1)b = 1 and therefore we obtain
a =
1
n
(
1
2
+
(n− 1) ln 2
λ
)
and b =
1
n
(
1− 2 ln 2
λ
)
By Lemma 4.5 the canonical profile is a Nash equilibrium if and only if∫ b
2
a−x∗
2
e−λtdt ≥
∫ x∗
b
2
e−λtdt (19)
where x∗ ∈ [0, a] is the unique solution of
e−λx
∗
= e−λ(a−x
∗)/2/2 .
So we get
x∗ =
a
3
+
2 ln 2
3λ
and
a− x∗
2
=
a
3
− ln 2
3λ
.
Plugging the above along with b/2 = a− ln 2 /λ into Eq. (19) we get
3
√
2e−λa/3 + e−2λa/3/ 3
√
4 ≥ 4e−λa .
Let τ = e−λa/3. The above inequality translates into
4τ3 − τ2/ 3
√
4− 3
√
2τ ≤ 0 .
Solving the inequality we get 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ1, where τ1 =
6√2+
√
64+ 3
√
2
8·25/6 ≈ 0.65. Plugging τ = e−λa/3
back in we obtain
λa ≥ −3 ln τ1 ,
and plugging in a = 1n
(
1
2 +
(n−1) ln 2
λ
)
we obtain
λ ≥ ln 4− n ln(4τ61 ) ≈ 1.39 + 1.24n
as the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium under the expo-
nential distribution.
5 Asymmetric Range Distributions
In this section we consider the asymmetric game GA(n, f), where the range boundaries of each
client v, BLv and B
R
v , are drawn independently at random. As in the previous section, we begin
by showing that the game satisfies assumptions (HM1), (HM2) and (HM3), allowing us to use
the results of Section 3.
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5.1 General Properties
Lemma 5.1. Let GA(n, f) be a game such that f is continuously differentiable and has full
support (i.e., f(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]), then GA(n, f) satisfies assumptions (HM1), (HM2) and
(HM3).
Proof. (HM2) and (HM3) follow immediately from Observation 3.1, so it remains to show (HM1).
Note that by Observation 3.1, H is the same as in the symmetric game GS(n, f), and thus by
Lemma 4.1, H is increasing and concave. It remains to show that M is monotone and concave.
Using the Leibniz integral differentiation rule we obtain
M′(x) = 1
2
(
1− F
(x
2
))2
+
∫ x
x
2
(1− F (t))f(x− t)dt > 0 .
Hence, M is monotone increasing. Taking the second derivative with respect to x yields
M′′(x) = −
(
1− F
(x
2
))
f
(x
2
)
+ (1− F (x))f(0) +
∫ x
x
2
(1− F (t))f ′(x− t)dt
and using integration by parts we get
M′′(x) = −
(
1− F
(x
2
))
f
(x
2
)
+ (1− F (x))f(0) + (1− F (t))f(x)|xx
2
−
∫ x
x
2
f(t)(f(x− t))dt
= −
∫ x
x
2
f(t)f(x− t)dt < 0
Hence, the function M is concave, and thus the lemma holds.
Due to Lemma 5.1, we may apply Theorem 3.6 and Theorem 3.8 to the game GA(n, f) and
we thus obtain the following two corollaries.
Corollary 5.2. Let n = 2, and let f be continuously differentiable and have full support (i.e.,
f(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]). Then the game GA(2, f) has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is
given by
s∗ =
{
sn,f , if F¯ (1/2) ≥ 1/2;(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, otherwise,
where sn,f is the canonical profile, with a corresponding canonical pair 〈a, b〉, where a and b are
given implicitly by the equation
F¯ (a) =
1
2
(
F¯
(
b
2
))2
+
∫ b
b
2
F¯ (t)f(b− t)dt
Corollary 5.3. Let n ≥ 3. For every game GA(n, f) where f has full support (i.e., f(x) > 0
for all x ∈ [0, 1]), if GA admits a Nash equilibrium it is unique (up to renaming the players) and
equal to the canonical profile 〈a, b〉 where a and b are given implicitly by the equation
F¯ (a) =
1
2
(
F¯
(
b
2
))2
+
∫ b
b
2
F¯ (t)f(b− t)dt .
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Lemma 5.4. Under the asymmetric game GA(n, f), the function ρ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] satisfies that
ρ(x) > x/3, for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Recall that ρ(x) = arg maxy∈[0,x] θx(y). Furthermore, by Lemma 3.3, θx is concave, so it
follows that if θ′x(y) ≥ 0, (i.e., θx is non-decreasing at the point y) then ρ(x) ≥ y. Thus, it suffices
to show that θx(x/3) ≥ 0 for every x ∈ [0, 1]. Plugging Eq. (5) and (6) into the definition of θx
we obtain
θx(y) =
∫ y
0
(1− F (t))dt+
∫ x−y
2
0
(1− F (t))dt+
∫ x−y
x−y
2
(1− F (t))F (x− y − t)dt .
By Leibniz’s integral rule, the derivative with respect to y is given by
θ′x(y) = 1− F (y)−
1
2
(
1− F
(
x− y
2
))2
−
∫ x−y
x−y
2
(1− F (t))f(x− y − t)dt .
Plugging in y = x/3 yields
θ′x
(x
3
)
= 1− F
(x
3
)
− 1
2
(
1− F
(x
3
))2 − ∫ 2x3
x
3
(1− F (t))f
(
2x
3
− t
)
dt ,
using differentiation by parts and rearranging we obtain
θ′x
(x
3
)
=
1
2
(
1− F
(x
3
))2
+
∫ 2x
3
x
3
f(t)f
(
2x
3
− t
)
dt ≥ 0 ,
which proves the claim.
Lemma 5.5. The game GA(n, f) admits a Nash equilibrium if and only if
H(ρ(a)) +M(a− ρ(a)) ≤ 2M(b) , (20)
where ρ(x) is defined implicitly by the equation
F¯ (ρ(x)) =
1
2
(
F¯
(
a− ρ(x)
2
))2
+
∫ a−ρ(x)
a−ρ(x)
2
F¯ (t)f(a− ρ(x)− t)dt .
Proof. By Lemma 5.1, GA(n, f) satisfies assumptions (HM1), (HM2) and (HM3). Therefore, by
Lemma 3.9, GA(n, f) admits a Nash equilibrium if and only if Eq. (13) and (14) are satisfied.
Recall that by the definition of the canonical profile, a is the optimal location for player 1 within
the interval [0, a+ b], i.e., ρ(a+ b) = a. Thus, by Lemma 5.4, it follows that a ≥ (a+ b)/3, which
yields a ≥ b/2. Therefore, by assumption (HM2) and the monotonicity of H and M, we obtain
H(a) +M(b) ≥M(a) +M(b) ≥ 2M
(
b
2
)
Thus, Eq. (13) always holds in the asymmetric setting. Hence, the game admits a Nash equilibrium
if and only if Eq. (14) is satisfied. The lemma thus follows.
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Theorem 5.6. If GS(n, f) admits a Nash equilibrium and
∂
∂x
(∫ x
x
2
F¯ (t)F (b− t)dt
)
≥ 0,
then GA(n, f) admits a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If n = 2, by Theorem 3.6, the theorem holds. Assume n ≥ 3. To simplify notation, let
s = sn,f , be the canonical profile of GS(n, f). Let 〈a, b〉 the canonical pair of GS(n, f). Let u˜i
denote the utility of player i in the game GA(n, f). Similarly, throughout this proof, we use the
notation H˜, M˜ and ρ˜ when referring to GA(n, f), while the original notation refers to GS(n, f).
Let
∆(x) =
∫ x
x
2
F¯ (t)F (b− t)dt .
Note that by Observation 3.1 we have that M˜(x) =M(x) + ∆(x) and H˜(x) = H(x) for every
x ∈ [0, 1], and therefore for every internal player i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1} we have that
ui(s) = u˜i(s) + 2∆(b)
and for peripheral players
u1(s) = u˜1(s) + ∆(b) and un(s) = u˜n(s) + ∆(b) .
Let x∗ = ρ(a) denote the best response in the hinterland (0, a) in the game GS(n, f), and let
x˜∗ = ρ˜(a) denote the best response in the hinterland (0, a) in the game GA(n, f). Since s is a
Nash equilibrium in GS(n, f) we have that
ui(s) ≥ ui(x∗, s−i),
which can be written as
2M(b) ≥ H(x∗) +M(a− x∗) (21)
Assume towards contradiction that a− x˜∗ > b. Due to Lemma 5.4 we get b ≤ 2x˜∗, and it thus
by monotonicity of M and since M(x) = H(x/2) we get
ui(s) = 2M(b) <M(2x˜∗) +M(a− x˜∗) = H(x˜∗) +M(a− x˜∗) = ui(x˜∗, s−i) ,
in contradiction to s being a Nash equilibrium in the symmetric game GS(n, f). Hence, a−x˜∗ ≤ b.
Moreover, by assumption, ∆(x) is increasing with respect to x, so we have that
∆(a− x˜∗) ≤ ∆(b)
Therefore,
u˜i(x˜
∗, s−i) = H˜(x˜∗) + M˜(a− x˜∗) = H(x˜∗) +M(a− x˜∗) + ∆(a− x˜∗)
≤ H(x∗) +M(a− x∗) + ∆(a− x˜∗) ,
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where the last inequality is due to the optimality of x∗ with respect to the functionH(t)+M(a−t).
But ∆(a− x˜∗) ≤ ∆(b), so plugging Equation (21) in the above we get
H˜(x˜∗) + M˜(a− x˜∗) ≤ 2M(b) + ∆(b) ≤ 2M˜(b) = u˜i(s) (22)
Therefore, there is no improving move for an internal player in GA(n, f) under s.
Let 〈a˜, b˜〉 5 be the canonical pair of GA(n, f), and let s˜ = s˜n,f be the corresponding canonical
profile. If we show that b˜ ≥ b, then Equation (20) would hold, which would conclude the proof
by Lemma 5.5. This is due to the fact that
2M˜(˜b) ≥ 2M˜(b) ≥ H˜(x˜∗) + M˜(a− x˜∗) ≥ H˜(ρ˜(a˜)) + M˜(a˜− ρ˜(a˜)) ,
where the first inequality is due to the monotonicity of M˜, the second inequality is due to
Equation (22), and the last inequality is due to Lemma 3.4(c). Hence, it remains to show that
b˜ ≥ b.
We will show that a˜ ≤ a, which is equivalent. Consider the function g(x) = H˜′(x)− M˜′((1−
2x)/(n − 1)). By the definition of the canonical pair, we have that g(a˜) = 0. Moreover, by
concavity of H˜ and M˜ we have that g is decreasing, and by Lemma 3.5 it has at most one zero.
Hence, every x such that g(x) ≤ 0 must satisfy x ≥ a˜. Furthermore,
g(a) = H˜′(a)− M˜′((1− 2a)/(n− 1)) = H′(a)−M′(b)−∆′(b) = −∆′(b) ≤ 0 ,
where the second and third equalities are due to 〈a, b〉 being a canonical pair, and the last in-
equality is due to the assumption. Thus, a˜ ≤ a, which concludes the proof.
Again we conclude with a couple of example distributions and their equilibria.
5.2 Example 1: The Uniform Distribution
This is the same as the uniform distribution for symmetric games, except that both range boundary
parameters BLv and B
L
v need to be drawn uniformly at random. We have the following.
Proposition 5.7. For the game GA(n, f), where f is the uniform distribution, there exists a
Nash equilibrium if and only if n = 2, and it is equal to the strategy profile (1/2, 1/2).
Proof. Using Corollary 5.3, we get
1− a = 1
2
(
1− b
2
)2
+
∫ b
b
2
(1− t)dt ,
which translates to
1− a = 1/2− b2/4 .
By definition 〈a, b〉 satisfies 2a + (n − 1)b = 1. So, as in the symmetric setting, we get that the
only solution is a = 12 and b = 0. Hence, G
A(n, f) has a Nash equilibrium if and only if n = 2.
5Note that by Lemma 3.5 H′(1/2) ≤M′(0), and thus H˜′(1/2) ≤ M˜′(0), so the canonical pair 〈a˜, b˜〉 exists.
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5.3 Example 2: The Exponential Distribution
Finally, we consider the game GA(n, f) where f is the density function of the exponential distri-
bution with parameter λ > 0. That is, the range of each client v is asymmetric and exponentially
distributed, i.e., BLv , B
R
v ∈ Exp(λ). Slightly abusing notation, we refer to this game as GA(n, λ).
We dedicate special attention to this distribution for three main reasons. First, the exponential
distribution is commonly considered in geometric models, and has been shown to apply to many
real life situations. Second, the game GA(n, λ) is mathematically equivalent to a fault-prone
Hotelling game, studied in our related paper [7]. In this game, faults occur at random along the
line, and clients cannot visit players separated from them by a random fault. Hence, our results
on the exponential distribution can be applied directly to fully characterize the equilibria of an-
other interesting variant of the Hotelling model. Finally, this example demonstrates that even
though the condition of Theorem 5.6 does not always apply to the exponential distribution, and
the condition given for the existence of Nash equilibria in Lemma 5.5 is somewhat hard to work
with, it is nevertheless possible to fully analyze certain useful classes of client range distributions.
By Corollary 5.2, if n = 2 then the game always admits a Nash equilibrium, which is the
canonical profile if it exists, and (1/2, 1/2) otherwise. For n ≥ 3, by Corollary 5.3, if the game
admits a Nash equilibrium then it is equal to the canonical profile. Consequently, to fully charac-
terize the equilibria of the game, the following theorem determines, for any given n and λ, whether
the canonical pair of GA(n, λ) is Nash equilibrium. More precisely, the theorem characterizes a
threshold function λmin(n) such that the game G
A(n, λ) admits a Nash equilibrium if and only if
λ ≥ λmin(n).
Moreover, the exact formulation of the threshold function λmin(n) depends on a global constant
α0. While there is no closed form formula for α0, it is implicitly defined as the unique solution of
Eq. (23) and (24) in the interval [0, 1] (see Figure 2), which is approximately α0 ≈ 0.58813.
Theorem 5.8. GA(n, λ) for n ≥ 3 admits a Nash equilibrium if and only if
λ ≥ λmin(n) = (n+ 1)α0 − 2 ln
(
1 + α0
2
)
,
where α0 ∈ (0, 1) is the unique constant given implicitly as the solution to the following equations:
e−α(1 + α) = e−2β(1 + β) , (23)
e−α
(
1 +
α
2
)
= e−β
(
3
4
+
β
2
)
. (24)
Moreover, α0 ≈ 0.58813, implying that a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if
λ ≥ λmin(n) ≈ 0.58813n+ 1.04931 .
We start our analysis by deriving the functions H and M by plugging the cumulative distri-
bution function of Exp(λ), i.e., F (t) = 1− e−λt into Eq. (5) and (6). This yields
H(x) = 1
λ
[
1− e−λx
]
(25)
M(x) = 1
λ
[
1− e−λx
(
1 +
λx
2
)]
(26)
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We can characterize the canonical pair of the game GA(n, λ), provided it exists. By Corol-
lary 5.3, given an integer n ≥ 2 and a real λ > 0, the canonical pair 〈a, b〉 exists if and only if
λ > 2 ln 2 and is given by the following equations:
eλ(b−a) =
1 + λb
2
(27)
2a+ (n− 1)b = 1 (28)
By Lemma 5.5, in order to prove Theorem 5.8, it suffices to show that making a non-local
move, namely, relocating an internal player to ρ(a), the optimal location within the hinterland, is
not improving. Plugging Eq. (25) and (26) into the definition of ρ(x), we obtain that in the game
GA(n, λ), for every x ∈ [ln 2/λ, 1], ρ(x) is given implicitly by
eλ(x−2ρ(x)) =
1 + λ(x− ρ(x))
2
(29)
Lemma 5.9. Let x ∈ [ln 2/λ, 1]. Then,
H(ρ(x)) =M(x− ρ(x)) + 1
2λ
e−λ(x−ρ(x))
Proof. By Eq. (25),
H(ρ(x)) = 1
λ
[
1− e−λρ(x)
]
Plugging in Eq. (29), we get
H(ρ(x)) = 1
λ
[
1− e−λ(x−ρ(x))
(
1 + λ(x− ρ(x))
2
)]
=
1
λ
[
1− e−λ(s−ρ(x))
(
1 +
λ(x− ρ(x))
2
)]
+
1
2λ
e−λ(x−ρ(x))
Plugging in Eq. (26) we obtain the result.
Before we continue, we define a reparamatrization that will greatly simplify the following
analysis. Define
α = λb and c = 1− a/b . (30)
Lemma 5.10. The values c, b, a and λ can be expressed in terms of α and n as follows.
(1) c = ln
(
1+α
2
)
/α;
(2) b = 1/(n+ 1− 2c);
(3) a = (1− c)/(n+ 1− 2c);
(4) λ = α(n+ 1)− 2 ln((1 + α)/2).
Proof. Substituting c and α into Eq. (27) we obtain ecα = (1 + α)/2, which yields the first part
of the claim. Plugging a = (1 − c)b into Eq. (28) yields the next two parts. To obtain the last
part we plug the terms we obtained for b and c into λ = α/b.
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Observation 5.11. The parameter λ is monotone increasing as a function of α for all α > 0
and n > 2. Therefore, α is a monotone increasing function of λ as well.
The observation follows from the fact the α derivative of λ is strictly positive.
Keeping n fixed, by Lemma 5.10, for each α > 0 we obtain λ, a and b, such that 〈a, b〉 is the
canonical pair of GA(n, λ). Moreover, by Observation 5.11, considering λ as a function of α over
the domain α ∈ (0,∞), λ obtains all the values λ ∈ (2 ln 2,∞).
Lemma 5.12. If b ≥ a, then sn,f is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma 5.5, it suffices to show that the canonical pair a and b satisfies Eq. (20) if b ≥ a.
Consider the right hand side of Eq. (20). We have that
H(ρ(a)) +M(a− ρ(a)) ≤ H(ρ(a)) +H(a− ρ(a)) ≤ 2H
(a
2
)
≤ 2H
(
b
2
)
.
The first inequality holds since M(x) ≤ H(x) for all x ≥ 0, the second is due to the fact that H
is concave and thus H(x) +H(a− x) ≤ 2H(a/2) for every x ∈ [0, a], and the last follows from the
assumption and monotonicity.
Therefore, Eq. (20) is satisfied if
H
(
b
2
)
≤M(b) .
Plugging in Eq. (25) and (26) we obtain
1
λ
[
1− e−λb/2
]
≤ 1
λ
[
1− e−λb
(
1 +
λb
2
)]
.
Rearranging we obtain
eλb/2 ≥ 1 + λb
2
,
which holds for all λ and b, concluding the proof.
Observation 5.13. α ≥ 1 if and only if b ≥ a.
Proof. By the definition of c in Eq. (30), M ≥ H when c ≥ 0. By Part (1) of Lemma 5.10, c is
non-negative if and only if α ≥ 1.
Lemma 5.14. Fix n ≥ 3, let α > 0 be as in Lemma 5.10, and express λ as in Part (4) of
Lemma 5.10. Then sn,f is a Nash equilibrium if and only if there exists β > 0 such that
e−α(1 + α) = e−2β(1 + β) (31)
and
e−α
(
1 +
α
2
)
≤ e−β
(
3
4
+
β
2
)
. (32)
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Proof. Let t = a− ρ(a). By Lemma 5.9,
H(ρ(a)) +M(a− ρ(a)) = H(a− t) +M(t) = 2M(t) + 1
2λ
e−λt ,
so we may write Eq. (20) as
M(b) ≥M(t) + 1
4λ
e−λt .
Plugging in Eq. (26) and rearranging we obtain
e−λb
(
1 +
λb
2
)
≤ e−λt
(
3
4
+
λt
2
)
.
Setting α = λb and β = λt in the above, we obtain Eq. (32). Note that t is uniquely determined
by α, and therefore β may be derived from α.
By Eq. (29),
e−λa = e−2λt
(
1 + λt
2
)
,
and plugging in Eq. (27) we get
e−λb
(
1 + λb
2
)
= e−2λt
(
1 + λt
2
)
,
which translates to Eq. (31).
Since each α > 0 defines a unique canonical profile and a unique β, it follows that Eq. (31)
and (32) are equivalent to Eq. (20). Therefore, by Lemma 5.5, Eq. (31) and (32) are necessary
and sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5.8.
Proof of Theorem 5.8. By Observation 5.13 and Lemma 5.12, if α ≥ 1 then the canonical profile
is a Nash equilibrium. It is left to consider 0 < α < 1. By Lemma 5.14, Eq. (31) and (32) are
sufficient and necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium. We rewrite these equations as follows.
e−α(1 + α) = e−2β1(1 + β1) , (33)
e−α
(
1 +
α
2
)
= e−β2
(
3
4
+
β2
2
)
, (34)
β1 ≤ β2 . (35)
Clearly, Eq. (31) and (32) hold for α if and only if Eq. (33),(34) and (35) hold for that α.
Figure 2 shows Eq. (33) and (34) as parametric curves.
We next show that for 0 < α < 1 these two curves intersect at a single point (α0, β0), as
depicted in Figure 2. First note that by the implicit function theorem these two curves are
continuous and differentiable for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Additionally, it is easy to check that if α = 0
then β1 < β2 and that if α = 1 then β1 > β2. Hence, the two curves intersect at least once for
0 < α < 1. To show they intersect exactly once, we consider the α derivatives of β1 and β2, and
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Figure 2: The solid line corresponds to Eq. (33) and the dashed line corresponds to equation (34).
(α0, β0) is the unique intersection of the two curves.
show that, at each intersection point, dβ2/dα > dβ1/dα. Since β1 and β2 are continuous and
continuously differentiable as functions of α, this suffices to show that they intersect only once.
Accordingly, we now show that dβ2/dα > dβ1/dα at each intersection point. By implicit
differentiation (i.e., taking the α derivative of both sides of an implicit function) we obtain
−e−α α = −2e−2β1(1 + 2β1) dβ1
dα
and
−e−α
(
1 + α
2
)
= −e−β2
(
1 + 2β2
4
)
dβ2
dα
.
Rearranging, we get
dβ1
dα
=
1
2
e2β1−α
(
α
1 + 2β1
)
and
dβ2
dα
= eβ2−α
(
2 + 2α
1 + 2β2
)
.
Let (α0, β0) for 0 < α0 < 1 be an intersection of the curves, i.e., when α = α0 we have β1 = β2 =
β0. Therefore, dβ2/dα > dβ1/dα if
eβ2−α
(
2 + 2α0
1 + 2β0
)
>
1
2
e2β0−α0
(
α0
1 + 2β0
)
,
which yields
4
(
1 +
1
α0
)
> eβ0 . (36)
Assume β0 > 0, otherwise Eq. (36) holds and we are done. By Eq. (33), we get
e−α0(1 + α0) = e−2β0(1 + β0) ≤ e−2β0(1 + 2β0) .
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Since e−x(1 + x) is monotone decreasing for x > 0, it follows that 2β0 ≤ α0. Hence, since α0 < 1,
we get
eβ0 ≤ eα0/2 < e1/2 < 4
(
1 +
1
α0
)
,
and thus Eq. (36) holds. This proves that the curves defined by Eq. (33) and (34) intersect only
once for α > 0.
It follows that Eq. (31) and (32) are satisfied if and only if α ≥ α0. Hence, by Lemma 5.14 and
Lemma 5.10, the canonical profile xn,λ for λ = α(n + 1) − 2 ln((1 + α)/2) is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if α ≥ α0. Since, by Observation 5.11, λ is strictly increasing as a function of α, the
theorem follows.
The second part of the theorem is obtained by numerical approximation of the point of inter-
section (α0, β0).
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